Post-election debate

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recora to blame MOST explanations of Labour's defeat advanced from the Left are based on false assumptions. We may disregard those that are the product of a massive denial, for example that Labour's defeat was really a major success as never before have 8½ million of British electors voted for what is claimed to be a socialist programme.

The more fashionable assertion, however, namely that the electoral defeat was due to the half hearted way the Labour leadership put over some Manifesto policies is only marginally less insane. It seeks to explain a situation produced by the interaction of several often unrelated factors, by singling out one and ignoring the others. Here once again the Left has yielded to the opportunist temptation to score debating points instead of making a serious attempt at a genuine analysis.

There is in fact no evidence that elections are won or lost as the result of a few weeks of campaigning on no matter how good a progimme. Whether they consciously realise it or not, the great majority of electors does not decide on how to vote by reading the manifestos of the various parties. They decide on the basis of their cumulative experience of many years.

The main source of the loss of Labour's credibility as an alternative government should therefore be traced to Labour governments 1964-70 and 197479, and not to what the two Labour ex-Prime Ministers have said during the election campaign. It was the record of these two governments which convinced even many of those who VLADIMIR DERER of the CLPD presents his views, continuing our series discussing the outcome of the election.

continue to vote Labour that a Labour government is incapable of effectively tackling Britain's economic problems. Thatcher's strength derived precisely from the opposite impression, namely that she has broken with the past Tory (and Labour) practice of tinkering with the economy.

It would have taken Labour several years of systematic and relentless political education to have succeeded in convincing the electorate that Britain's present economic difficulties are rooted in the capitalist structure of the economy itself and that the only way to bring about a lasting industrial revival would be through a government directed investment programme carried out on the basis of a major extension of public ownership in the crucial sectors of the economy. Those responsible for Labour's policies, including the Bennite ""Left" , consistently shy away from this vital conclusion. Thus up to a point, they have capitulated before the anti-Labour propaganda about the tion pularity of "nationalisa.

The issue of defence is in a slightly different category. True, the parliamentary leadership was only partially identified with the demand for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Yet it cannot be seriously argued that the electors were confused about what Labour's defence policy was, or that they would have viewed it more favourably had Callaghan, Healey and Hattersley been converted to unilateralism.

Attitud Socialist politics is not solely about declarations of attitudes, no matter how 'principled' or about rational argument. If this were so the battle for socialism would have been won long ago. Socialist politics must take into account the prevailing state of consciousness of the masses, consciousness which under capitalism is inevitably a false one. It must also take into account the fact that the great mass of people can partially free themselves from that consciousness only when confronted with concrete choices in concrete situations and not as the result of abstract arguments.

When it comes to the choice of immediate demands such as are embodied in the Party's Manifesto, it means emphasis on and mobilising support for demands that are acceptable to potential Labour voters and which, if implemented, would create a new situation more favourable to the achievement of socialist objectives.

So far as the nuclear issue is concerned, the rejection of the Trident, of the Cruise missiles as well as the removal of US nuclear bases from this country, seemed to be acceptable to potential Labour voters, whereas a formula that in their eyes would have left Britain defenceless was clearly not. To ignore this was to abandon politics in favour of preaching.

Confidence

But despite the weakness of Labour's position on defence, the unilateralist issue could never have played the part in the election campaign it did, had it not been for the general loss of confidence in the Party's ability to deal with the problem of the economy and unemployment, which was the issue the electorate were most concerned about.

Kinnock, Hattersley and Heffer.

NEC VOTES ON CRUCIAL ISSUES.

KEY TO SYMBOLS F= FOR A = AGAINST O = ABSTENTION - = ABSENT OR NOT VOT * = NOT ON NEC THEN 1) No action against Militant (Dec 8 2) Oppose 'shortlist' of one (May 8: 3) For trade union rights for Youth Opportunity Programme Trainees (July 81) 4) Support NEC commitment to remove nuclear weapons from Britain' (July 81). 5) Endorse Peter Tatchell (Dec 8 6) No enquiry into Militant (Dec 7) Endorse Pat Wall (Feb 82) 8) Immediate ceasefire in the Falklands (May 82) 9) Keep the commitment to i eral disarmament' in Labour's Programme 1982 (May 82) 10) Reject Militant Tendency Report (June 82) 11) Keep the commitment to nationalise clearing banks in NEC statement to conference (July 82) 12) NEC should not oppose Conference amendments calling for removal of NEC's arbitrary poweis over pressure groups and calling fo impartial conditions for the operation of pressure groups (Sept 82) 13) Total opposition to incomes policy and support for guaranteer minimum wage (Sept 82). 14) Keep Benn, not Golding, as Chair of Home Policy Committee (Nov 82) 15) Carry out 1981 Conference decision to allow CLPs to carry ol a full re-selection in the event of boundary changes (Feb 82) 16) Against expelling the Militant Editorial Board (Feb 83) DUNWOODY KINNOCK RICHARDSON. • GOLDING HEFFER AOAAF A F FAF •FA F AFOAF AF - A F