Socialist Organiser

The weekly of the fused Workers Socialist League, July 1981 to April 1984

British Labour and a united Ireland

Socialist Organiser no. 124, 17 March 1983 · scan pp. 12–13 · about 1,520 words

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"The Catholics, for very understandable reasons, don't trust the security forces..." "I would want to have a look at human rights issues there, like the delay in getting death certificates and coroners' reports on children killed by plastic bulle!

We'll make the forces be seen and felt to be totally impartial. I haven't got a magic wand that would do that...

In the first part of this interview, last week, Clive Soley, the Labour Party's deputy spokesperson on Northern Ireland, explained Party policy and his own views. The second part, this week, covers some of the issues raised. Next week: a commentary by the interviewers, Jonathan Hammond and John O'Mahon JO'M: What do you think of the fact that the Unionists seem to be divided into orly three political trends: those who want Northern Ireland independence, those who want something like the old system of Protestant rule, and those who want integration with Britain?

CS: I wouldn't define them in that way. I'm looking for those who vote Unionist because there is nothing else for them to vote but who realise that things can't stay as they are, that there have got to be changes, and you have got to make concessions.

They are not going to be your party activists, by any stretch of the imagination. The vast bulk of those will be opposed to what 1 am saying - very opposed, regardless. The Northern Ireland Labour Party is just as opposed to me as the Demacratic Unionists (Paisley) and the Official Unionists.

Margaret Thatcher's unemployment bas probably done more to make the sort oí policies that 1 am talking about make sénse to some of the people than almost aartbing else. Harland and Woolf five rea:s ago sould have earen grass rather -u také orders from the South. Now JET •I deside zire erders itom ibe SAII. INI CNo FI DE MIriTE S I Ha-zé DE TnÉ DIE FTE JI I'I iE IK TUK IÍ SIÇE FD KE I0: CERPiT ETRiTES I je painicai pro cess. aad who desperately want econPIx Lac palcical stabiliry, and are FrEZIIC I DOTE.

JH: Ia Brcers receseh ibere bas beer a meoniscoon of recist cat-trish feeling. Yos ces set it is the right ring of the Tory party saying that votes should be taren away from Irish citizens. And the outcry against Ken Livingstone inviting over representatives of Provisional Sinn Fein highlighted some of the anti-Irish feeling that exists. How will the next Labour government deal with anti-Irish feeling over here?

CS: The party in the House of Commons is very strongly opposed to any nonsense like taking the vote from Irish people, and is generally aware of the dangers of that sort of racist ieeling.

But the danger to the sort of policy I'm outlining doesn't come from the Parliamentary Labour Party, as some people think. It actually comes from the bulk of the labour movement. The further north you go in Britain, there are within the trade union movement very deep Protestant feelings.

I understand this. It is one of the probusurs, uun i rust ine securiy jorces..."

lems I face, and I think the party doesn't always face up to it generally — that the unionists are to some extent supported by attitudes within the labour movement here. That, frankly, is a bigger danger to my policy than just anti-Irish feeling generally. That will always be around while there are bombings and so ón.

The fact is that we have imposed the problem on the Irish, and we ought to face up to our responsibility. I get quite a good response to that from MPs. It's not necessarily so good in some sections of the labour movement.

JO'M: One view of what's happened since, say, the Labour government was returned in 1964, would be that pressure by that government on the Orange state for reforms simply exacerbated the situation and made it more explosive. You had the Orange backlash, the destruction of the old political system because of the incapacity of people like O'Neill, Chichester Clark, etc. to lead the masses of Protestants. Britain acted timidly all the way through. It simply stirred up the antagonism, and then, when it came to the crunch in 1974, backed away from the Protestant general strike.

Desirable as some of the things in your policy might be, they are all skirting the problem, all avoid tackling it head-one - particularly, I would say, your commitment to a majority within the artificial Sit Counties.

It could be argued that you are merely going to exacerbate the situation instead of tackling it head on - by, for example, a decision to get out, a declaration of intent to get out, an energetic attempt to reach an agreement with the Republi. ic about restructuring, and British payment of all sorts of indemnities or whatever you want to call them.

CS: It's surprising you should say that. The picture you describe is not different from what I've been saying except that you are saying in some way you do it without consent.

JO'M: No.

CS: My question back to you is, what happens in a new Irish stare if the unionists fight?

JO'M: I thick pos condo not coerce tbe axionists. Seite certaint you sonid bave to have a federed bretend aad gice them rights over their ours affairs. The thing is that a British Labour govers. ment could create the political conditions for change by a declaration of intent to withdraw; by really energetic determination to change the whole structure and framework to make some form of a united Ireland realistic politics for the Protestants - give them options where they would have an incentive to accept change.

CD: I haven't ruled out any of that. JO'M: But if you start by accepting the majority's rights within the artificial entity, then you are in fact saying to them: "We'll always let you veto us". CS: No, I'm not saying that at all. All I'm saying, very clearly, is that what we'll do is first have talks with the Dublin government — whatever government it happens to be - to set up new economic and social institutions, and we do not allow them to veto that.

I've already indicated that, obviously, governments can get pressurised and deflected if the pressure is strong enough. That's where the political skill comes in.

There would be a major effort not to allow any group or any individual te veto those things that were agreed by London and Dublin. In effect what I'm saying is: Yes, we are giving a strong commitment to get our. We are not setting a date. I think, as I've said, a commitment to getting out is not a policy for a united Ireland — it might be that the real policy is to have a commitment to a united Ireland, and that's what I'm saying. You yourself say we can't do it by coercion. Therefore we have got to do it by consent. But you don't allow them to veto the political progress.

JO'M: How would a new Labour government treat the Catholics?

CS: Better!

JO'M: For example, it was a Tory gouernment which granted political status as part of an attempt to find a new solution after Bloody Sunday (when 13 unarmed men were shot dead in Derry, on January 30 1972) A Labour government took it away. You still seem to be committed to a policy that would involve a continual barassment of a big section of the Catholic population.

CS: I would hope things like the Prevention of Terrorism Act can go, and that we would have a major review of the Emergency Provisions Act. I would want to have a whole look at human rights issues there, like the delay in getting death certificates and coroners' reports on children killed by plastic bullets, and all sorts of other things like that.

That won't come about quickly. The Catholics, for very understandable reas ons, don't trust the security forces, and it's very difficult to change that quickly. I mean, l'd like to change it tomorrow morning.

We'll make the forces be seen and felt to be totally impartial. I haven't got a magic wand that would do that. I have got a number of things in my mind, including an all-Ireland. police force, that would help do that. But not overnight, I fear.

JH: What do you feel about restoring political status to Republican prisoners? CS: I would not give political status. I've always been very opposed to political status, not least because as an ex probation officer I very strongly take the view that if you decide to lock people up for whateres reason then you should treat them equally, except on the grounds of security (i.e. a burglar doesn't get the

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singer ** Socialist Organiser no. 124. March Far Far distant, future?

CS: I don't think so. I'm working as fast as possible on this programme. Although I'm not setting dates, I'm not writing it off as some distant future aim.

JO'M: You are using the 'unionist

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