[The British Tory government looked on with envy…]

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The British Tory government looked

on with envy as US President Reagan confronted and smashed the air controllers' union PATCO last summer.

Now Norman Tebbit is at work pressing home new laws to shackle the British unions. JOHN McILROY looks at the background to the present legal restraints on the American workers' Miners protest at Taft-Hartley injunction handed down by Jimmy Carter. They defied it — and won!

frothers and sisters. The Union was fined $10,01 novement remained one of for his personal contemp A NEW labour movement was forged in the 1930s. The previous decade had been one of stagnation and retreat for the American Federation of Labour. By 1929 the proportion of organised workers had dropped to 10% of the labour force - half the 1919 figure.

The movement of Samuel Gompers, going for "more" through purely economic methods, ignoring politics, refusing to recruit the unskilled and semi-skilled, obsessed with the differentials of the shrinking craft workers, had exhausted its impetus.

In the heavy production industries metals, rubber, leather, petroleum, chemicals - and in communications and public utilities, unions were nonexistent or limited to the tiny skilled strata. As America woke up to depression, the AFL stood idly by as workers stood in soup lines, starving strikers were herded off the picket lines, and protesting workers were savagely beaten by state cops and company goons.

The inauguration of Roosevelt as President in March 1933, initiated a new era. His mission was the revival of US capital. His adventurous method was to increase consumption by expanding purchasing power, partly by wage regulation, partly by stimulating the growth of trade unionism.

Stirrings

This strategy coincided with the first stirrings of the millions of forgotten workers and their insurgent movement that was to find its embodiment in the Committee of Industrial Unions.

Roosevelt's first piece of legislation, the National Recovery Act, gave workers a right to organise and bargain collectively and prohibited any interference by employers and also contained minimum wage clauses. A National Labour Relations Board was established, to administer elections and arbitrate disputes.

Fix congrater 19 movement.

John L Lewis This basic structure, developed in the 1935 Wagner Act which outlawed "non-union" contracts and listed other unfair employer practices, represented a break from the "voluntarist" tradition in which the state had kept out of labour relations and the AFL had actively rejected any support or sustenance from government It undoubtedly encouraged union organistion. It also created a framework through which to channel the upsurge, and a legal base which could later be built upon through straight anti-union law.

In the mid-30s, the famous strikes in Toledo, Minneapolis and the San Francisco waterfront started a movement initially confined by the conservatism of the AFL. Indeed, by 1936 union membership was barely back to its 1920 level.

Reacting to the thwarted militancy, the leaders of the new unionism -Lewis, Murray, Hillman and Dubinsky - saw their own opportunity, established the CIO within the AFL.

In 1937 militant strikes unionised the steel industry, sit-downs in auto forced General Motors and Chrysler to sign agreements, and picketing workers shut down the clothing industry, quintupling union membership. That one year made 3 million new members.

The continued conservatism of the AFL led the CIO to formally break from it.

Yet, the new movement had crucial weaknesses. Like the new unionists in the UK 50 years before, the CIO leaders looked to the state. And they looked not to independent labour representation but to Roosevelt and the Democratic Party.

Lewis, Murray and Hillman, representatives of the post-1880s immigration, found the AFL's 'anti-politics' stance rugged individualism, antiquated and ineffective. But they retained a deep belief in the capitalist system.

They were not militants or union democrats. Socialism was unacceptable, revolution unthinkable.

The movement they supported for their own institutional reasons was, however, built up from the base by socialists. Entering the CIO with the most experienced and numerous political cadre, the Stalinists reaped the benetits.

Their politics further helped to derail the movement. As the US entered the war, Roosevelt was able to secure a 'no-strike' pledge and acceptance of rigorous wartime controls Copsescortscab coal durin from AFL and CIO leaders - and from the CP.

ratriotic strike-breaking. and witch-hunting miners' leader John L Lewis who (using isolationist arguments) opposed the war, was the CP policy. This alienated them from the militants and paved the way for their later destruction.

The true revolutionaries of the Socialist Workers Party, despite inspired leadership in Minneapolis and Toledo were few in number and able to exercise only a small influence. As James Cannon himself said, "Except in a few localities we let the great movement of the CIO pass over our heads.

Nemesis

After the war 15 million Americans held union cards. The high point -and the nemesis - of the "great movement" was at hand. 1945 produced a great wave of radicalisation in the world working class.

The USA experienced the greatest strike movement in its history. The scale of struggles dwarfed "the red decade" of the 30s. In 1935-9 the average working days lost was 17 million. In 1945 this leapt to 36 million. In 1946 it was 19/8 miners' sitire With the ending of war producuon, 4 millon workers were dumped out of jobs, overtime was cut, prices continued to rise. Truman, Roosevelt's successor, told a working class looking for rewards for the depression and wartime sacrifice, " • . . we cannot hope with a reduced work week to maintain now the same take home pay for labour generally that it has had during the war. There will have to be a drop."

Fearing a return to the 30s, the workers marched with their feet. A series of bitter wage disputes exploded.

In November 1945, a quarter of a million General Motors workers struck at 92 plants in 50 cities. In a bitter 113 day stoppage, the out price increases' resounded from the picket lines to be taken up by Auto Workers leaders like Walter Reuther.

"Disaster'

In January 1946, as a national steel strike began, 2 million workers in the basic industries were on strike. Two weeks after the victorious General Motors settlement, half a million miners led by Lewis, walked out of the pits in what Truman called 'a national disaster' They went back with what the Miners Journal called ' ... the greatest economic and social gains registered by the UMWA in a single wage agreement since the birth of the union in 1890."

In May the railworkers came out. In September 1946, every part of the country was paralysed by the biggest maritime strike in US history. In November, the mineworkers were out again.

The militancy of the striking workers was, unfortunately, not matched by their leaders. There was no unified, co-ordinated strategy. Workers struck and returned according to their own bargaining timetable and settlements UM SIL INT vithout regard for their conomic militancy.

Even the demand for a abour Party failed to wreak through to wider ayers.

Nonetheless, the force of he turmoi led even a lardened bureaucrat like President Phillip Murray to comment, "... I private enterprise fails to ive workers jobs at good vages, turning out things ve all need, the people vill recognise the failure if private capital."

Paved

As oil, glass, and transport workers joined in the strike wave, Truman reached for the law. The price was now to be paid for legal support in the 30s. Wagner would soon be seen to have paved the way for an all-out legal onslaught on the unions.

The wartime SmithConnally Act was due to expire shortly. However, as the miners struck for the second time in 12 months in November 1946, Truman successfully sought an injunction under the Act against the strike.

The court order was defied by the whole union membership. On November 27 Lewis was brought before the court for contempt. He was commanded to withdraw the strike call.

For all his inadequacies, Lewis had more spunk than the whole of today's TUC General Council •put together. He refused. Walter Reuther

SHOULD STICK

On December 4 tr Under hysterical attar from government media, fearing the Unir would be bankrupted, ar with little support fro other union leaders, Lew backed down. He appeale to the Supreme Court ar called off the strike uni March 1947 when tł appeal would be heard.

Truman had earli demanded draconian leg powers to replace Smit] Connally. He wanted 1 be allowed to draft ‹ strikers into the army. H bill was put aside by tr senate however, in favor of the Case Labour Di putes Bill. 1-18 Truman, now faced wil mid-term elections, cha ged his tune. He felt tr unions represented toc important a block of Demi cratic Party support ! ignore and vetoed tr Republican Bill which ha been passed by bot Houses.

In the elections, in ial te 1946, the Republicans cal tured both Houses / of Congress and a majority ! of state governments from th le Democrats. Fresh ant union legislation wi inevitable. It took shape : aS the Taft-Hartley Bill, comprehensive measu re which took the Wagn er Act structure and filled it with a profoundly ant union content.

The Bill, introduced c 3 January 1947, had tr same concerns as the Bill Norman Tebbit now pr gressing through Parli ment. It was intended 1 halt solidarity strike restrict blacking an picketing and smash up th closed shop. Its aim was 1 weaken union bargainir power and reduce membe ship.

Demarcation dispute and restrictive practice were banned. To use tr Labour Relations Boar‹ unions had to register wit the Secretary of State f Labour. Union recognitio would depend on stat supervised secret ballot. The government coul seek 80 days cooling o off or safety'. The employer

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Socialist Organiser no.85 May 1982 Page 13

----- pull-quotes -----

slogans, 'open the books' and, 'wage increases with-

periods in strikes whic 'imperil the nation's healt