Reagan's : sanctions: bark but

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the Polish crisis. The most important of these sanctions were suspensions of future export licenses for electronic equipment, computers, other high-technology materials, and oil and gas equipment.

In themselves, the sanctions will not hurt the Soviet Union very much, especially since grain sales under current authorisations--the bulk of US exports to the Soviet Union-will continue.

Reagan felt compelled to bark at the Soviet Union over Polana, but his measures don't have much bite.

Despite Reagan's rhetoric, he obviously is not upset about the suppression of Solidarnosc. US imperialism routinely supports repressive regimes all over the world from El Salvador to Chile to South Africa, Israel and South Korea.

Privately, Reagan undoubtedly supported the suppression of Solidarnosc. From his point of view, too, it had gone "too far" . Its actions threatened to set off movements that might Reagan topple not only the Stalinist bureaucracies in Eastern Europe but also a few capitalist governments in Western Europe.

Apart from their political motives, the Western imperjalists had strong economic motives for wanting Solidarnose suppressed. Poland owes the imperialist banks some $27 billion&. Only a Poland under Stalinist "law and order" might be able and willing to pay this money back.

Even if he privately sympathised with the Polish and Soviet bureaucrats. Reagan was quite happy to exploit the Polish crisis to justify even more militarism in the US. And he was quite pleased to have a foreign diversion to try • to take American workers' minds off the growing economic crisis in the US.

Bandwagon

Reagan's sanctions have received enthusiastic support in the US not only from Republican but also from Democrat party "liberal» Politicians from Senator Moynihan to conservative Senator Byrd. The American labor bureaucrats have also jumped on the bandwagon, with the AFLIO misleadership demanding even stiffer sanctions!

The same forces rallied to support President Carter's more drastic sanctions during the Afghanistan crisis two years ago.

Despite the apparent "public consensus" of the politicians and union bureaucrats, Reagan is limited in what he can do.

American workers do not want war with the Soviet Union. They do not support Reagan's policy of increasing arms spending while cutting social services. They oppose the draft and military intervention abroad.

Since 1982 is a critical congressional election year in the US, Reagan must move cautiously.

Also, there little Keagan can do to the Soviet Union directly. Militarily, the Soviet Union is 1oo strong to attack. Imperialist military moves into Poland would be suicidal.

Favours Nor is there much Us imperialism can do to the Soviet Union economically. Carter's sanctions had already cut American exports to the Sovict Union in half. Of the remaining annual $1.5 bittion. 1wothirds consists of agricultural exports.

Reagan will be extremely reluctant to eliminate them, since he owes many political favours to US grain interests.

High technology exports to the Soviet Union make up about $100 million, and oil and gas equipment make up about $400 million. Most of these could and would be made up by West Germany and the other advanced capitalist countries.

In particular, West Germany is certain to supply the equipment needed for its $9 billion gas pipeline from Siberia. It needs the pipeline in order to be less dependent on American imperialism, which dominates the capitalist world's oil and gas supplies.

Reagan's economic sanctions could only be effective if they included American grain and were backed up by the other imperialist powers.

But despite some sympathetic words from British Prime Minister Thatcher and French President Mitterand, the US's "allies" not surpris ingly, seem unwilling to go àlong with sanctions that would hurt them worse than they would hurt either the US or the Soviet Union.

The fact that Reagan's bark is worse than his bite over Poland must not blind the international workers' movement to the fact that the imperialists are united in their underlying hostility to the collectivised economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

They generally want to keep up military and economic pressure on the noncapitalist countries, even though self-interest and weakness may limit what they can do.

The imperialists all, to one degree or another, want to exploit the Polish crisis to justify their own militarism and to divert attention from their own economic and political problems.

In Britain, the US, West Germany, France or Japan, the workers' main enemy is at home.

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Socialist Organiser no. 67 January 7. 198? Page 3 •Trade union conterence